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INDEXES: CULTURAL NATURE AND NATURAL CULTURE
«In my youth I once read a French detective tale 
where the clues were actually in italics.»
 (Vladimir Nabokov, Lolita, 1955)
Abstract
Umberto Eco’s essential contribution to semiotics consisted in finding a theoretical 
equilibrium between deconstructive tendencies, aiming at presenting cultural habits as 
pure conventional but naturalized products, and motivational trends, claiming the nat-
ural fundament of constructed cultural habits. Fully comprehending and turning into 
analytical frame the concept of sign in Charles S. Peirce was instrumental to reach such 
equilibrium. In no other aspect of Umberto Eco’s semiotics it manifests itself with more 
evidence than in the characterization of indexes. The article seeks to propose a general 
theorization of their semiotic nature, starting from Umberto Eco’s interpretation of Peirce.
1. Introduction: Umberto Eco’s Pendulum
Umberto Eco taught us to see culture in nature. He indefatigably analyzed 
semiotic habits in order to show that they were such, although they had been 
naturalized by society and culture. In this respect, Eco’s intellectual contribution 
also consisted in dispelling the rhetorics of motivation, those that create cultural 
exclusion by simulating the natural sources of meaning. At the same time, Um-
berto Eco avoided the opposite extreme. He taught us to see nature in culture. He 
relentlessly sought to unveil the universal mechanisms of meaning behind the par-
ticularities of signification, although to most these seemed irreducible to a common 
ground. From this point of view, Eco’s philosophical legacy is also tantamount to 
the intellectual stance that refuses the rhetorics of arbitrariness, those that create 
cultural exclusion by overlooking the natural sources of meaning. Eco was able to 
keep a subtle but solid balance between these two theoretical traps because he fully 
understood Peirce, who himself gave rise to the philosophical project of semiotics 
exactly because of the necessity to find a new understanding of nature and culture, 
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arbitrariness and motivation. In no aspect of Peirce’s semiotics, as interpreted and 
popularized by Umberto Eco, this effort of intellectual equilibrium is more evi-
dent than in the semiotic exploration of indexes. When the nature of these signs 
is misunderstood in terms of an excess of naturalization, indeed, they are used 
by cultures in order to create and naturalize artificial divisions. That is the case, 
for instance, when a symbol of identity is bestowed upon an indexical relevance 
and wrongly attributed a causal dimension. At the same time, when the nature 
of these signs is misconceived because of an excess of culturalization, the sense 
of the different extent by which signs can be motivated is lost too. Paradoxically, 
exceedingly de-naturalizing indexes can give rise, by contrast, to a naturalization 
of symbols. Developing Eco’s intellectual project in the field of semiotics must, 
therefore, give rise to a full comprehension of how language interacts with reality 
in order to turn real relations into semiotic links.
2. Being, Mind, and Sign
In the philosophical ideology of Charles S. Peirce, meant as the abstract intel-
lectual imaginary that inspires the generation of his theoretical concepts, a distinc-
tion is posited between two dimensions, differentiated, above all, as regards their 
ontological status. Defining them as a purely ontological level, on the one hand, 
and a merely phenomenological level, on the other hand, would be simplistic. In 
reality, in Peirce’s philosophy, these two dimensions are themselves schematizations 
of the two polarities of the tension spanning between pure ontology and pure 
phenomenology. Both are implicitly characterized as theoretical limits: on the one 
side, a pure being that is completely accessible to cognition; on the other side, a 
pure cognition that is completely separated from being. The degree of cognitive 
accessibility to being within the span between these two theoretical limits defines the 
possibility of a semiotics, in terms of the relation between two points with diverse 
access to being within this span. Saying that something signifies something else, 
indeed, does not mean in Peirce, as the vulgate of semiotics regrettably suggests, 
that the former element is a manifestation and the latter a secret. It means, on the 
opposite, that, in relation to what is, the former element presents a lesser degree of 
accessibility than the former. It is as though, every time that there is semiosis, two 
points along the theoretical line that stretches between an unconceivable absolute 
being and an unconceivable absolute mind, were put into relation so that the 
one that is the most remote from the latter becomes an object to the one that is 
the most remote from the former, which in turn becomes its representamen. In 
the geometry of this ontological and phenomenological dialectics, however, it is 
evident that, whatever points are singled out along the abovementioned spectrum, 
a third point can be posited between the two, thus becoming a representamen of 
the former (the one that is closer to being) and an object to the latter (the one 
that is closer to the mind). In other words, if semiotics is the discipline that studies 
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signs, and signs are relations between a signifying entity and a signified one, there 
is no way to explain why one is the ‘active’ part of signification, whereas the other 
is its ‘passive’ part, without positing a third element that is intermediate between 
them, mediates between them, and provides a perspective (a “respect”, in Peirce’s 
definition of sign) for looking at the latter from the point of view of the former, 
to grasp the object through the representamen.
The relation of semiosis is, therefore, only abstractly dyadic, since there is always 
the possibility that a third element emerges and mediates the relation between 
the first two, and so on and so forth. When I look at the picture of my father, 
this complex conglomerate of signs presents my mind with the potentiality of 
accessing a more remote point of the ontological spectrum and to bring it to the 
fore of my mind, yet this protrusion of a distant being into the mind is always 
partial, for the picture and the persona of my father are immediately bridged by 
a third element, whose accessibility to being and availability to the mind will be 
intermediate between the two: looking at the picture of my father will not return 
his ontology but rather evoke some mental images of him stored in my memory, 
images whose access to being and availability to the mind will be intermediate 
between the persona of my father and his picture: on the one hand, these mental 
images are closer to him; on the other hand, they are farther from me; I therefore 
pragmatically need a picture to access them. As they access them through the 
picture, they shall function as an interpretant between an intangible object and 
an unsatisfactory representamen. The theory of the “unlimited semiosis”, though, 
correctly suggests that the emergence of these mental images does not ipso facto 
turn them into pure signs in an immediate relation with their object, for in this 
case too, other elements will emerge that situate themselves at yet another inter-
mediate distance between the inaccessible object and these mental images, thus 
acting as farther interpretants between the former and the latter. In our concrete 
and, therefore, imperfect example, the mental pictures elicited by the picture of 
my father will unfortunately not return my father to life, but rather enliven his 
memory. The result will be at the same time relieving and frustrating, depending 
on whether it is emotionally received either from the point of view of the lost 
being (memories are still too poor to capture the concreteness of a lost beloved 
person) or from that of the present cognition (mental images stored in memory 
are still closer to the living presence of my father than a picture is). The value 
of the example above is not diminished by the fact that the picture represents a 
person who is known to the picture’s beholder, for the presence of a mediating 
interpretant is always necessary for recognition, even when what is recognized 
is not a singularity (my father) but a category; a picture of a donzella pavonina 
certainly gives easier access to its object to people who are familiar, through ex-
perience or previously seen pictures, with the fish fauna of costal southern Italy, 
than to people who ignore it, although in this case access is rather not to to the 
singularity of the fish (as it might happen with the picture of the only fish in my 
aquarium) but to its species.
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Although it is not difficult to conjure an example so as to explain the dyadic 
relation between something that signifies something else and this something else 
that is thus signified, explaining the emergence of an interpretant between the 
two is more counter-intuitive. Why should there always be the possibility of an 
interspersion between two elements related through semiosis? And why must 
this interspersion always configure itself as an asymmetric mediation, giving 
rise to a sort of vectoriality between higher and lesser degrees of accessibility? 
In other and more succinct terms: how is it possible to measure the distance 
between mind and being? And what is the nature of this measure? Without it, 
indeed, semiosis would simply not be viable.
3. Reflexes, Signs, and Symptoms
In order to investigate the theoretical reasons for the potentiality of infinite 
intermediations between a representamen and an object, it is useful to reverse 
the direction of reasoning and, therefore, wonder about what conditions would, 
on the opposite, determine the impossibility of any such intermediations. In 
other words, in what circumstances would a representamen directly give access 
to an object, and vice versa, an object uniquely be given access to through a 
representamen? For that to happen, a situation should subsist in which two ele-
ments with uneven ontological status would be in such a relation that, given the 
presence of the more ontologically present entity, the less ontologically present 
entity would also come about. Such are, for instance, the conditions that underlie 
the emergence of what psychology calls “a reflex”. The doctor hits my knee with 
a little hammer and the knee-jerk reflex comes about. The reason for which 
the doctor does is exactly that I do not have any way to determine whether to 
react or not with my body to this stimulus, so that, when the reaction does not 
take place, or it exceedingly takes place, that immediately turns into a probable 
symptom of incorrect functioning of my nervous system. In the patellar reflex, 
indeed, the sensor neurons trigger the motor neurons in the spinal cord without 
activating those in the brain, which are triggered only after the reflex itself has 
occurred. In this case, then, a phenomenologically absent entity, that is, the 
knee-jerk reflex, is determined by a phenomenologically present entity, that is, 
the stimulus of the little hammer hitting the knee-cap, without the possibility 
of any intermediation. It is worthwhile noticing that, at the neuronal level, the 
possibility of intermediation arises when sensor neurons and motor neurons 
do not relate directly but through the mediation of brain neurons, that is, 
through the mediation of the mind. Hence, the link between the stimulus and 
the reflex can be defined as a binding relation of cause and effect: when there 
is no stimulus, there is no reflex; there is no reflex, unless there is a stimulus; 
and where such stimulus is there, the reflex must be there as well, at least if the 
body works correctly. The stimulus and the reflex, therefore, present a different 
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ontology: although the reflex is always potentially there if the nervous system 
of a body is healthy, it will not become an actual reflex without the stimulus.
Nevertheless, it would be improper to deduce that the stimulus and the reflex 
are linked by a relation of semiosis. If that was the case, then an intermediation 
should be possible between the representamen (the stimulus) and the object (the 
reflex); but such is not the case, as empirical evidence shows. In reality, the stim-
ulus is not the representamen of the reflex; it is its cause. And the latter is not the 
object of the former; it is its effect. A semiotic dimension intervenes when the 
patellar reflex is turned into the representamen of an object, that is, the correct 
functioning of the nervous system. This relation, however, is not the same as the 
relation between the occurrence of the stimulus and the occurrence of the reflex. 
Indeed, the reflex turns into the representamen of a nervous condition only be-
cause it is perceived “under some respect and capacity”, as Peirce’s definition of 
the sign reads, that is, in its capacity of revealing, by its mere presence or absence, 
the correct functioning of the nervous system. In this case, the relation between 
the representamen and the object is a semiotic one, exactly because it is not at all 
immediate. First of all, it is not immediate as regards the history of the relation. 
The term “knee-jerk” was indeed recorded for the first time by Sir Michael Foster 
in his Textbook of Physiology: «Striking the tendon below the patella gives rise to a 
sudden extension of the leg, known as the knee-jerk».1 The relation of cause and 
effect between the stimulus and the reflex already existed: someone whose knee-cap 
would be accidentally hit before 1877 would have manifested a knee-jerk reflex 
even before that date; however, a long history of physiological observation and 
experiments was necessary for this cause-effect relation to turn into the basis of 
a semiotic relation, such as that, by producing the knee-jerk through a stimulus, 
the correct functioning of the nervous system could be inferred. Even after this 
semiotic relation is established, however, and codified into physiology textbooks 
such as that of Michael Foster, its status is different from that of the cause-effect 
link. For the former to come about, indeed, the reflex must stand for the correct 
functioning of the nervous system not only under some respect and capacity 
(before the “discovery” of the patellar reflex, indeed, its inadvertent manifestation 
would merely stand for the fact that someone had hit the knee-cap with a hard 
and sharp object), but also for someone: only a competent observer, indeed, that 
is, a doctor well trained in physiology, could infer from the activation of the reflex 
that the nervous system causing it works correctly. An incompetent doctor would 
not influence the presence of the cause-effect link but would definitely hamper 
its actual (and not only potential) turning into the basis of a semiotic relation.
One should not deduce from that either, however, that the doctor, as competent 
observer of the cause-effect link, is the interpretant of it, that is, what determines 
its turning into a semiotic relation. The doctor is merely the interpreter, and not 
1 Foster 1894: III, 984.
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only of a cause-effect relation, but also of the semiotic relation that it entails; 
the doctor is, indeed, the interpreter of an interpretant. The occurrence of the 
thought of the relation is, according to Peirce himself, sufficient to establish the 
“real connection”: «[Indices are] signs which represent their objects by virtue 
of being connected with them in fact, although this fact be but the actual oc-
currence of a thought. […] The denotation of an index is essentially singular».2
Thus far, the article has inquired into the theoretical possibility of indexes 
meant as “natural signs”, stemming from direct relations of causality in the en-
vironment. In the following paragraphs, it will be pointed out that, according 
to Peirce as interpreted by Eco, such direct relations, although subsisting at the 
ontological level, cannot be conducive to semiosis, unless they are accompanied 
by an interpretant that turns them into indexical links deposited in the common 
sense of a community of interpreters.
4. Interpreting Interpretants
But what is the interpretant underneath the interpreter’s thought? The inter-
pretant is exactly the idea of a relation between a representamen and an object 
that is deposited in the common sense of a community of interpreters. In this 
case, in particular, it is deposited in the rather technical knowledge that, brought 
about by a long history of medical research, sees in the correct activation of the 
patellar reflex a probable symptom of the good health of an individual’s nervous 
system. Conceiving of the indexical relation that is at the basis of one of the 
semiotic types singled out by Charles S. Peirce as based, in its turn, on a causal 
relation, is essential in order to both characterize the former (and distinguish it, 
for instance, from icons or symbols) but also in order not to mistake it for the 
latter. To the reader who is not conversant in semiotics, it should be reminded 
that, in Peirce, icons, indexes, and symbols are three different modalities of se-
miosis, depending on whether a logic of similarity, causality, or conventionality 
prevails in the relation between the representamen and the object (but complexi-
fying this introductory definition is, however, precisely among the goals of the 
present article). Peirce himself sought to dispel the abovementioned ambiguity 
by positing the factual connection as a necessary, although not as a sufficient, 
condition for an index: an index must be based on factuality but it cannot be 
based on factuality only: «For example, the symptoms of disease are indices. For 
though they cannot serve as signs without being interpreted as such, yet that 
which renders them fit to be the signs they are is their factual connexion with 
the diseases, which would exist though nobody had remarked it».3
2 Peirce 1908: 842.
3 Peirce 1903: 491.
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The only correct way to interpret such characterization without incurring into 
contradictions is to consider it as a short form, a sort of abbreviation, for a more 
articulated definition, in which indexicality is defined not as stemming from 
causality, but as stemming from the cultural reception of it. That is probably 
the reason for which Peirce himself often defines the relation that underpins 
indexicality as characterized by reality and not by causality:
[…] the mode of representation may be by likeness or analogy, in which case, the 
sign may be called an Icon; or it may be by a real connexion, as a certain kind of rapid 
pulse is symptom of a fever, in which case the sign may be called an indication or Index; 
or finally the only connexion may lie in the fact that the Sign (a word, for example) is 
sure to be interpreted as standing for the Object, in which case the Sign may be called 
a Symbol […].4
In other contexts, and in other interpretations of Peirce, indexicality is defined as 
based on a relation of temporal and spatial contiguity between the representamen 
and the object. That too, however, appears to be imprecise. Indeed, it is true that, 
in most circumstances, causality entails the contact in time and space between 
cause and effect or, to say it better, between the state of the world that results after 
the exertion of a cause (effect) and the agency that impacts on such state (cause). 
Reducing the definition of indexicality to spatial and temporal contiguity only, 
however, would characterize it merely from a logical point of view, and not from 
a substantial point of view. A simple example will clarify that: walking along a 
shore, one realizes that the strand is full of footprints. These footprints function as 
icons, meaning that, in order to identify to what animal species its owner belongs, 
they must be recognized as tokens resembling an iconic type. The interpreter, 
however, does not receive these footprints simply as drawings, or as photographs, 
but as signs of the real presence, in the space of the footprints but at a previous 
time, of the animal to which the footprints belong. Indexicality therefore emerg-
es from a causality (the pressure of the animal’s weight on the sand has created 
the footprints), which in turn emerges from spatial and temporal contiguity (if 
the animal had not been there few minutes before the interpreter, the footprints 
could not have been created), yet both, i.e., causality and spatio-temporal con-
tiguity, must be turned into the basis of a sign by an interpretant, which cannot 
simply be causality itself, or contiguity itself. The chain leading backwards from 
indexicality to causality, and from this to spatio-temporal contiguity, cannot be 
reversed: causality entails spatio-temporal contiguity, but not vice versa, simply 
because, as logicians know, correlation is not causation; similarly, indexicality 
entails causality but not vice versa, for there are many effects that do not turn into 
the signs of their causes because there is no interpretant receiving them as such. 
As Peirce would suggest: «An Index is a sign whose signative virtue resides in its 
4 Peirce 1909: 637.
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factual relation to its object. Certainly, not everything that is in factual relation 
to another, or is seen to be so, is thereby an index of that other».5
The usual vulgate through which indexicality in Peirce is explained and thought of 
is, therefore, improper. Indeed, it transmits the impression that the force constituting 
the semiotic relation between an object and its indexical representamen is always 
the same. This received idea bestows upon indexes a sort of naturalization, as if they 
were signs of a different nature than symbols and icons; the product of nature, more 
than the product of culture. The difference between indexes and symbols has always 
been perceived as stark, and somehow blurred with that between arbitrariness and 
motivation, originating from Ferdinand de Saussure’s linguistics. Symbols would 
therefore be arbitrary, whereas indexes would be motivated. That is improper as well. 
On the contrary, one should rather define indexes as signs endowed with an arbitrary 
interpretant based on a motivated relation. The distinction with icons is subtler but 
has also been conceived as much sharper than it actually should. Indeed, as it has 
been underlined elsewhere, the difference between an icon and an index too is a 
matter of degree, not of nature; in icons, it is simply more difficult to comprehend 
what spatio-temporal contiguity and, therefore, what causal link has brought about 
the iconic relation that, by virtue of a similarity, links together a representamen and 
its object.6 Peirce himself seems to be aware of this gradualness when he writes:
[…] indices, or those signs which represent their objects by virtue of being connected 
with them in fact, like a clock, or a barometer, a weathercock, a photograph, etc. (The 
photograph involves an icon, as indeed do very many indices, while on the other hand 
drawings, portraits in so far they afford information do so because it is known that 
they actually imitated the natural objects and as such they are indices, not icons. But 
if you draw a fancy picture of a man with certain physiognomical peculiarities in order 
to see what sort of an impression of such a man’s disposition you will get in this way, 
or if you construct a geometrical diagram according to a certain precept and observe 
certain relations between its parts which appear to be consequences though they were 
not explicitly required by the precept construction, these things are signs of their objects 
merely, by virtue of the analogy, and are true icons).7
But, also when he suggests that, after all, the index is an icon of a peculiar 
kind: «In so far as the Index is affected by the Object, it necessarily has some 
Quality in common with the Object, and it is in respect to these that it refers 
to the Object. It does, therefore, involve a sort of Icon, although an Icon of a 
peculiar kind […]».8
5 Peirce s.d.: S104.
6 Leone 2017a.
7 Peirce 1905: L67.
8 Peirce 1903: 540.
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Considering a footprint on a beach as an index, indeed, means recognizing 
that a spatio-temporal contiguity has produced a causality, and that this has, in 
turn, brought about an indexicality, whose semiotic and, therefore, triadic and 
non-dyadic nature, can be recognized exactly in relation to the possibility of a 
fake. Everything that can be faked is a potential object of study for semiotics, 
as Umberto Eco wittily declared in the Trattato di semiotica generale (A Theory 
of Semiotics).9 Spatio-temporal contiguity, however, cannot be faked, because 
it is not a phenomenological matter but an ontological one. It can be ignored, 
but that does not entail its inexistence. Either something is in a certain space 
and at a certain time or it is not. Also, causality cannot be faked either, because 
that would contradict the notion itself of causality. If an element A contains in 
itself an agency that, when A ontologically occurs in the same space and at the 
same time that B, changes B, so that change in B is actually the effect of the 
agency of A, then the relation between agency and change must be a dyadic, 
not a triadic one. Every time that A is in spatio-temporal contiguity with B, B 
will change accordingly. If it does not, it is because the relation between agency 
in A and change in B is not one of direct causation but one of metaphorical 
causation, or simple correlation. One of the most relevant difficulties of social 
sciences, for instance, is that the relations of causation that they identify in the 
world are not properly such. The increase of wealth in a society does not reduce 
the demographic rate in that society in the same way in which heating water 
over 100 degrees Celsius makes it boil. But that is exactly the reason for which 
Peirce does not define the relation that underlies indexicality as “physical” but 
as “quasi-physical”: «An index is a representamen which refers to its object in a 
quasi-physical way, independently of whether there is an interpretant or not».10
The present section has sought to complexify the customary but stereotypical 
definition of “indexicality” in Peirce by pointing out the difference between a 
physical and a real relation between the representamen and the object. Further 
light on the topic will now be cast through investigating the possibility of faking 
an index, that is, through conventionally staging a sign that is usually received 
as “natural”. The possibility of such staging actually point at the elements of 
conventionality that are hidden in the definition of an index.
5. Faking Indexicality
If spatio-temporal contiguity cannot be faked, because it is an ontological matter, 
and if causal relation cannot be faked either, for otherwise it would not be dyadic, 
indexicality, which emerges from both, can always be faked. There is no index that 
9 Eco 1975: 18.
10 Peirce 1901-1902: 1147.
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cannot be faked. A footprint can be produced by simulating the shape, size, and 
depth that a truthful footprint would produce; crime stories are full of ingenious 
characters who, having committed a crime, fake some clues, many of them being 
indexes, in order to divert the attention of the police. Many of the research passions 
of Umberto Eco, from the fake in the arts up to conspiracy theories, exactly revolve 
around the cultural possibility of bringing about fake indexicality, whose rhetoric 
of motivation is such that its persuasive effects are usually greater than those of 
fake iconicity or fake symbolism.11 Eco was deeply interested in lying and famously 
defined semiotics as the discipline that studies everything that can be used to lie, 
perhaps the most successful definition of it ever.12 One thing is to forge a mostly 
symbolical document, like the Donation of Constantine, another thing is to forge 
a mostly iconic document, like the numerous fakes by Modigliani, and yet another 
is to forge a mostly indexical document, like the Holy Shroud of Turin.
Indexicality is, therefore, not based on the way in which the human mind 
understands contiguity and causation but on they way in which a culture posits 
both. The concept of hypoicon, meant as an icon in which the relation of simi-
larity or analogy between the representamen and the object is preponderant even 
beyond the inevitably cultural and, therefore, arbitrary reception of it, should 
be paralleled by a similar concept of “hypoindex”, that is, an index in which the 
strength of the relation of spatio-temporal contiguity and, therefore, causality 
emerge as real even beyond their cultural reception. Peirce seems to refer to this 
kind of strong indexicality when he distinguishes between degenerate indexes, 
on the one hand, and pure indexes, on the other. This distinction is fundamen-
tal also in order to seek to clarify a matter that has frequently been left in an 
ambiguous formulation, or not dealt with at all, that is, the relation between 
pragmatic indexicality on the one hand, and semiotic indexicality on the other. 
When Peirce refers to pure indexes, he has in mind pragmatic indexicality:
The other form of degenerate sign is to be termed an index. It is defined as a sign which 
is fit to serve as such by virtue of being in a real reaction with its object. For example, 
a weathercock is such a sign. It is fit to be taken as an index of the wind for the reason 
that it is physically connected with the wind. A weathercock conveys information; but 
this it does because in facing the very quarter from which the wind blows, it resembles 
the wind in this respect, and thus has an icon connected with it. In this respect it is not 
a pure index. A pure index simply forces attention to the object with which it reacts and 
puts the interpreter into mediate reaction with that object, but conveys no information. 
As an example, take an exclamation “Oh!” The letters attached to a geometrical figure 
are another case. Absolutely unexceptionable examples of degenerate forms must not 
be expected. All that is possible is to give examples which tend sufficiently in towards 
those forms to make the mean suggest what is meant. […]
11 Leone 2017b.
12 Eco 1975: 18.
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An index is a sign fit to be used as such because it is in real reaction with the object 
denoted.13
On several occasions, Charles S. Peirce combines together two conceptual 
definitions: on the one hand, the index as that type of sign in which the relation 
between the representamen and the object is characterized by spatio-temporal 
contiguity, which begets a factual or real connection, which begets, in turn, the 
indexical link. That is the case of the weathercock, which indicates the direction 
of the wind because of its position in time and space in relation to it, because 
of the agency that the wind exerts on the direction of the weathercock, and 
by virtue of the presence of a cultural interpretant (common sense knowledge 
about the function of weathercocks in a society) allowing an interpreter to turn 
a spatio-temporal and factual connection into a sign. On the other hand, Peirce 
considers as indexes those signs that somehow force the attention of the interpreter 
to direct itself in a certain way. The most common of these signs is the one that 
gives its name to its entire semiotic category, that is, the pointing index. When 
an index is pointed at something, be it also an empty spot in space, the attention 
of the beholder is somehow compelled to follow this indication, which creates a 
connection between the emergence of this sign in a perceptual scene (the tip of the 
pointing finger) and the area of such space toward which attention is attracted to.
One of the strong argument that the present paper intends to propose is that 
the semiotics of Umberto Eco entirely revolves around a problematization of the 
notion and analysis of indexicality. This semiotic attitude, consisting in detecting 
the cultural determinations of naturalized habits, is also what ultimately defines 
the philosophy of Umberto Eco, who was essentially a subverter of clichés. His 
way of seeking to make reality more intelligible to human beings crucially entailed 
underlining how semiosis, although omnipresent in culture, is frequently forgotten 
and overlooked, its arbitrary results transformed into areas of motivation. Such 
preoccupation of Eco is not only semiotic but also philosophical, in the sense of a 
social philosophy of knowledge, for Eco correctly intuited that arbitrary construc-
tions of motivation are a fundamental mechanism in the genesis of power and its 
counterpart, that is, subjugation. It is through naturalizing cultural arbitrariness 
that relations of power are created among human beings.
6. Indicality and Indexicality
Peirce seems to encourage, moreover, the inclusion, within the conceptual 
sphere of indexicality, not only of gestural indexes, but also of those deictics 
that, in contemporary pragmatics, are studied under the label of “indexicality” 
too; when I say “here”, for instance, this word has a conventional and, therefore, 
13 Peirce 1904: 517.
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symbolical nature in the terms of Peirce; its object, however, is signified by the 
verbal (written or oral) representamen through the spatio-temporal connec-
tion that it has with a certain point of space and time, so that this condition 
of spatio-temporal contiguity between space, time, and the word turns into a 
factual link and, consequently, into the possibility of an indexical interpretant 
to emerge. All languages seem to be endowed with the capacity for signifying 
the connection between a certain place in time and space and the location in 
time and space of the expression that points at it; verbal signs that create these 
connections vary from language to language, meaning that their acting as 
verbal representamens of such indexical connection is in itself arbitrary; there 
is no particular motivation for which one should use the word “here” instead 
of the word “ici” in order to create a spatio-temporal and, therefore, real and 
indexical connection between the time and place in which the word is uttered 
and a spatio-temporal area of proximity around the physical source of such 
utterance. Hence, the word “here” is a representamen that conventionally and, 
therefore, symbolically relates to the idea of pointing at a space and time close 
to the physical source of utterance of the word; the connection between the 
source of this utterance and the space and time signified by the word, however, 
is not arbitrary at all but motivated by a relation of spatio-temporal contiguity. 
Signboards in parks or other public areas contain the typical indexical sentence 
“you are here”, combined with an arrow or other indexical visual sign pointing 
at a place in the map. This sentence is composed by three English lexemes, all of 
them endowed with an indexical signification. The three of them are conventional, 
meaning that there is no particular motivation for their having the phonetic 
and graphematic shape that they have (indeed, they would be translated into 
different words with the same meaning in other languages); they are, however, 
motivated by the binding conventionality of language: in English, in order to 
say “here”, one must use this word; there is no other alternative way of express-
ing the same indexical meaning; that is not a motivation in the sense that the 
meaning of “being hic et nunc” is contained in the shape of the word “here”; it 
is contained, however, in its usage according to the English langue. The relation 
between the sentence and the place in which it manifests itself in its graphic 
form, however, is fully indexical, although it does not relate directly to space 
but to an iconic representamen of it (the map); the sentence, then, indexically 
refers to space through this iconic signification, so that a mental operation of 
projection is necessary in order to correctly interpret the sentence. If someone 
read it without operating this projection into the iconic representamen, then 
the sentence would signify the pleonasm that its reader is there where he or 
she reads the sentence, and not actually in the place of the map where the sen-
tence is readable. Nevertheless, although this indexicality is referred to the map 
where the sentence is written, and not to the actual space where the sentence is 
read, its indexicality is clear: it stems from the physical contiguity between the 
sentence, the graphic sign of the arrow, and the iconic representamen of the 
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space where both appear; in this case too, however, the presence of a cultural 
interpretant in the social encyclopedia is necessary in order for this conjunction 
of verbal and graphic indexes to express their indexical signification. First of all, 
one should know English in order to correctly interpret the sentence “you are 
here”; knowledge of English, however, would be required to correctly interpret 
the symbolical link between the sentence and its object, and not the indexical 
link between the sentence and the point in space represented in the map; such 
link, however, also requires a certain visual competence in realizing that the red 
point on the map, or the arrow represented therein, signify an indexical relation 
to the iconic representation of it.
Whereas the conventional nature of verbal deictics is clear, non-verbal index-
ical signs with a deictic significance, such as arrows or the ‘same’ pointed finger, 
have too often been considered as simply motivated. Umberto Eco has given an 
important contribution, already in his Trattato (A Theory of Semiotics) (1975), to 
dispel such misconception: from Sherzer’s seminal study on lip-pointing among 
the Cuna of Panama on (1973), increasing ethno-semiotic evidence has been 
gathered about the fact that postural and gestural indexicality too is object to 
cultural variation14 and, therefore, underpinned by the institution of an “indexical 
common sense”. But Eco’s ability of ‘awakening culture’ from the illusion of be-
ing nature is evident in the whole immense intellectual production of the Italian 
scholar: his insights about literature, the arts, and perhaps especially about cultural 
practices, quotidian rituals, and everyday life are all attentive to exploring and 
mapping the encyclopedia of cultures, showing that it emerges from the activity 
of language in nature and not from that of nature in language. After all, Eco de-
fined the threshold that he posited between semiotics and cultural anthropology, 
in his seminal treatise of general semiotics (1975) as a “political one”, respectful 
of academic domains rather than motivated by disciplinary definitions. Indeed, 
the field of semiotics is culture as a whole, as it is for cultural anthropology, and 
blurring and intermingling between the two disciplines has going on since the 
onset of the former, younger methodology. Yet, what characteristically defines the 
approach and the novelty of semiotics is precisely an attention to the verbal and 
non-verbal making of cultures as encyclopedias, as meshes of semiotic habits that 
turn into the paradoxical, cultural ‘second nature’ of a society.
7. Conclusions
A particular intellectual strategy emerges from the majority of Umberto Eco’s 
theoretical works. It might be characterized as follows: variability, variation, and 
variety are consubstantial dimensions of both nature and culture, although the 
14 Enfield 2001.
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latter, also in its relation with the former, tends to organize singularities and 
idiosyncrasies into types. After all, language is nothing but the result of the 
human patterning of nature. Nevertheless, one should neither believe that such 
variability hinders and frustrates any cognitive and, a fortiori, linguistic effort, 
nor that it is illusory and actually mysteriously stems from the same underpin-
ning universals. In the concrete field of the history of ideas, Eco contrasted the 
first conception of variability through his dialectics with Jacques Derrida and 
deconstructionism, whereas he countered the second conception through his 
controversies with the exclusively deductive semiotics of Algirdas J. Greimas. In 
between these two excesses, Eco proposed a simple but clever solution, which 
is the same he adopted in order to deal with the issue of the relation between 
literal and metaphorical meaning: the latter cannot be fully grasped if the 
former is not posited. Similarly, cultural variability is appreciable only on the 
background of a grid of meta-semiotic understanding of the variations that it 
produces. As regards the study of the types of signs singled out by Peirce, and 
continuously problematized by the US philosopher, such theoretical attitude 
consists in distinguishing between different degrees of variability: indexes, which 
were the primary object of the present article, are of course multifarious, but 
their variety can be entirely comprehended and systematized only on the basis 
that they all stem from a more general principle, called “indexicality”. Semio-
ticians should, of course, study indexes, but always with the effort of framing 
them as instances of the semiotic principle from which they descend. That 
should not entail, however, that the principle of indexicality, as well as that of 
iconicity, is universal and immutable. It is simply more cross-culturally stable 
than the signs that it brings about. To give an example: lip-protruding and 
finger-pointing are both gestural indexes, using different parts of the body with 
divergent dynamics, yet they always refer to the same principle that undergirds 
indexicality, that is, the creation of a link between a spatio-temporal contiguity, 
a factual relation, and the emergence of an indexical interpretant. It is only 
by virtue of this abstract common root, indeed, that subtle differences among 
indexical cultures can be appreciated. Visiting a Buddhist temple in China, for 
instance, one realizes that local devotees avoid pointing at details of Buddha’s 
iconography with their fingers, and prefer doing it with their open hands, as 
if this second indexical gesture was somehow endowed with a “softer” Gestalt 
than the other. This difference, however, that probably derives from a complex 
interaction between cultures of subjectivity and gestural patterns (fingers “in-
dividualize” their object more than open hands do), can be taken into account 
only if compared in relation to a common semiotic formula, which is the one 
that Peirce first, and Eco after him, painstakingly sought to pinpoint. That does 
not mean either, however, that the abstract level of “indexicality”, as those of 
“iconicity” or “symbolicity”, be immune from variety. Semiotic anthropology 
and cultural semiotics must precisely undertake the task of showing how not 
only indexes but also the same ideology of indexicality changes in the passage 
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from a culture to another, or in the transition from an epoch to another. 
Eco’s contribution somehow stopped at this threshold, the “political frontier” 
between semiotics and anthropology, which he himself had set in the Trattato 
di semiotica generale. Hence, there is perhaps no better way to pay homage to 
the great Italian intellectual than challenging such a threshold, and seeking to 
develop an even more-encompassing understanding, not only of how indexes 
change on the background of a common indexicality, but also of how indexical 
ideologies change on the background of a common nature.
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